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“The Law is just words after all”: Torture, Truth, and Language in the Post 9/11 United 
States and  Percival Everett’s The Water Cure 
 
The prisoner is bound to an inclined board, feet raised 
and head slightly below the feet. Celophane is wrapped 
over the prisoner’s face and water is poured over him. 
Unavoidably, the gag reflex kicks in and a terrifying 
fear of drowning leads to almost instant pleas to bring 
treatment to a halt.  
   ABC News, November 2nd, 2007.  
 
One may see the functions of judicial torture, or 
interrogation torture, as a torture of the truth.  
  Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish.  
 
What happens to you here is forever. 





 In a recent article, James Dawes has argued for “the importance of an explicitly 
articulated human rights framework to Americanist literary criticism” as well as the 
“importance of Americanist literary criticism to that same human rights framework” (‘The 
Novel of Human Rights’130). This imperative is driven in part by what Dawes identifies as a 
new subgenre of “the human rights novel” in American literature consisting of a “range of 
new literary forms and narrative patterns [which] cohere into [a] unique generic stability” and 
which have emerged “alongside the consolidation of rights culture and rhetoric in the United 
States” (132). As Dawes acknowledges, the “concept of human rights is not new” in the U.S., 
drawing attention to the fact that, for example, Frederick Douglass frequently used the term 
(127). Indeed, as Joseph Slaughter charts, human rights were being evoked regularly “by 
African American and abolitionist newspapers in both the North and the South in the middle 
of the nineteenth century [and], almost weekly, in Frederick Douglass’s The North Star” 
(747). What is new, Dawes insists, is that the U.S. is, in the twenty-first century, experiencing 
a “popular culture of human rights” and a “corresponding increase in institutional 
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intersections between human rights and literature” (128).1 For Dawes, literary writing (and by 
extension, literary criticism) can “participate in […] the work of human rights” (That the 
World May Know 218). There is an urgency to Dawes’s insistence that American literary 
studies engage with the framework of human rights, and Elizabeth Swanson Goldberg and 
Alexandra Schultheis Moore identify September 11, 2001, as the date when human rights and 
literature, as a field of scholarly pursuit, “gained formal momentum [with the] shift in 
political, social, cultural, and intellectual landscapes at that point [seeming to] obviate and to 
render imperative the connection in relation to changing understandings and practices of war, 
imprisonment, torture, and immigration” in the U.S. context (2). 
Writing in 2014, Rachel Potter and Lyndsey Stonebridge meditate on the recent turn 
to human rights in literary studies, suggesting that “it is born of two pressures. The first [is] 
internal […] with the current potpourri of literary methodologies [leaving] a discipline in 
search (yet again) of a purpose. The dodgy humanism of practical criticisms past is now a 
new historical memory,” and “there is a feeling that literature can, indeed must, be made to 
matter once more. That demand also comes from outside of the academy. It is not simply the 
case that the turn to rights is a response to the pressure that the humanities defend themselves 
in straightened economic and ethical times. Putting human rights into the humanities is more 
than just a slick way of gesturing real-world seriousness to sceptical education accountants; it 
is also a response to the question of how it is possible to imagine rights today” (2). As Potter 
and Stonebridge highlight, “If we are turning again to literature to help us think about rights 
[…], this is not least because it seems that once more we are charged […] with imagining 
something that is not there” (2). This absence is paradoxical since today human rights are 
“everywhere and nowhere: everywhere spoken, defended, legislated for; nowhere in civilian-
targeted warfare, the labour camps supplying mass consumption and enforced migration” (2).  
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 Human rights are ‘everywhere and nowhere’ in Percival Everett’s 2007 novel, The 
Water Cure. Its treatment of torture through its form and content draws our attention to the 
intimate relationship between language and the law and shows us that the person as subject of 
the law is as rhetorical as it is given; that just as words can become people, people can 
become words. Words can create and they can destroy. Specifically, as my reading of the 
novel alongside the rewriting of U.S. laws that legislate for and provide the conditions for the 
use of torture—the rewriting of torture—shows, words create torture that destroys the human, 
culture, and civilisation. The Water Cure is a complex and experimental novel that cannot be 
reduced to being about any one thing, but the fact that it is framed by and infused with torture 
is worthy of critical attention. From its title onwards, the novel is engaged with its political 
moment of production – the war on terror – and the conditions that have resulted in the 
United States legally sanctioning the use of torture as a method of truth-seeking, and it 
questions this through both its form and content. As I show in this article, the novel achieves 
this in a number of ways; through the story of the traumatised and grieving father of a 
murdered child seeking revenge by torturing the prime suspect; through the breakdown of the 
language of the novel, with the novel being a tortured text; and through its intertextual 
relationship with Lewis Carrol’s Alice stories, which allows for an interrogation of the logic 
of the law so central to those nineteenth century texts and to the contemporary moment. In 
this way, The Water Cure allows the discerning reader to understand that, far from being a 
“series of isolated actions taken by heroic individuals in a moment of extremity,” torture is, 
rather, “a socially embedded practice” (Gordon 1) and it is embedded through language, 
reminding us of Bourdieu’s insistence that it is the language of the law that creates the social 
realm. The novel also underscores the importance of literature in understanding the law and 
rights more generally. It is broadly accepted in the field of law and literature that both 
disciplines have “common properties of language and vision” with law being a “matter of 
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language” and with the “fundamental connection” being “the sentence” (Dolin 2). It is for 
this reason that I read the novel in tandem with the changes to U.S. law regarding the use of 
torture as a method of interrogation showing that it is the logic of the law in the specific post-
9/11 moment that allows for the unmaking of the world.  
The Water Cure, is a text which confronts the law, its language and its logic, head-on 
in order to explore the destruction caused by torture exposing the inherent paradox of liberal 
society by showing that through its linguistic codes and logic it is able to produce the 
conditions for torture.  Whilst the scholarship on The Water Cure is not extensive it has 
largely been read, justifiably, as formal experimentation; an exploration of language and 
identity; a tale of grief, melancholy and revenge; and an engagement with ancient Greek 
philosophy.2 These readings are enormously insightful, and the novel is concerned and 
engaged with all of these, but it is striking that to date the novel has not been analyzed in 
relation to the law with which, through its formal experiments with language and logic, it is 
so entangled. Because of this it is perhaps less surprising that the novel has not been 
identified as an intertext of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking 
Glass, texts which are, of course, extended meditations on logic and the law.3 This 
intertextual relationship is not incidental, it is a rewriting of sorts which centralises the 
question of torture, logic, and truth and it is through this, as well as its fragmented form, its 
breakdown of grammar, and its own playful experiments of logic, that The Water Cure 
interrogates the formal legal structures that have allowed torture to be practiced by the U.S.. 
The novel enacts how torture as a practice destroys language, meaning, the rule of law, the 
individual, and the social realm. In doing so it also forces us to consider the aesthetic 
implications of its internal destruction of art.  
 There are two main reasons, I suggest, for the need to engage with literature in order 
to understand the role of the law in the use of torture and its consequences for American 
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culture. First, and most obviously, is that it is the novel as genre and form which has 
historically individualized humanity and “projected the social and cultural conditions out of 
which human rights must be recognized as commonsensical” (Warren 21 quoting Slaughter 
29). Indeed, as Brook Thomas and William P. MacNeil have both demonstrated, in different 
contexts, there is an intimate historical relationship between literature and the law (Thomas 
2007; MacNeil 2011). The second, and the main focus here, is that both the law and literature 
as language are creations of the individual and collective imaginary with both being largely 
conceived of as world-making; as Ian Ward highlights, “the rule of law is a product of the 
imagination before it is a product of legislative and judicial acts” (Ward 15).  
It is not so surprising that there is an increased momentum to connect American as 
well as World literary studies and human rights in the context of the war on terror, since, so 
far, the twenty-first century has witnessed a perpetual crisis within the post-Enlightenment 
project of modernity; a modernity that gave birth to both the novel and human rights, the 
former associated with the birth of the individual human subject and the latter born out of the 
renunciation of torture as a practice that leads to the truth.4 Democracy and the rule of law, 
the triumph of the second half of the twentieth century, is in decline,5 and we are witnessing 
an authority crisis in today’s liberal order where, according to Stephen Hopgood, U.S. 
hegemony wanes and we are entering a neo-Westphalian world. “That is”, he tells us, “a 
world of renewed sovereignty, resurgent religion, globalized markets, and the stagnation or 
rollback of universal norms about human rights” (166). As Hopgood underscores, “[t]he core 
modernizing assumption, that history brings with it secularism, a sense of oneself as an 
individual rights holder, and the erosion of collective beliefs and loyalties, is fracturing 
alongside the western power that sustained it.” (166). Human Rights, the concept of which 
relies on an understanding of universal human dignity, is eroding indeed, with a cacophony 
of voices justifying and legitimizing the use of torture as a moral imperative in the post 9/11 
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world, with some people deserving of “no humane treatment” since they are so “depraved” 
(Krauthammer 321), and insisting once more that torture leads to truth. Since the devastating 
events of September 11, 2001, we have not only discovered that the U.S. government and its 
allies have employed torture techniques in the war on terror, but we have witnessed what 
Rebecca Gordon has called a “mainstreaming of torture,” with ethical questions about the use 
of torture coming to the fore once more; questions that most had assumed were long-settled 
(Gordon 2014) but are now eliciting positive – if reluctant – responses from across the 
political, legal, social, and cultural spectrums. At the heart of the debate about the use of 
torture is the role of and rule of law and my contention here is that if we are to intervene 
critically with those “changing understandings and practices of war, imprisonment, torture” 
in the US context (Goldberg and Moore 2) it is imperative for critics of American literature 
not only to connect the field with that of human rights but also with its parent discipline, law.  
          *** 
 
The law I am referring to is the binding body of rules that a country institutes and is 
enforced by a controlling authority, usually the government. It is a form of language and 
linguistic practice that creates worlds. In this way, the law is also an authorative symbolic 
pronouncement. Scholar of literature and law, Kieran Dolin, reminds us of Bourdieu’s 
assertion that the, “[l]aw is the quintessential form of the symbolic power of naming that 
creates the thing named” and has the “linguistic capacity to make things true simply by 
saying them.” Further, “it would not be excessive,” Bourdieu suggests, “to say that [law] 
creates the social world, but only if we remember that it is this world which first creates the 
law” (Bourdieu The Force of Law 838, quoted in Dolin 12). If law creates the conditions of 
the social world, and language is central to the “entire practical activity of ‘world-making,’” 
with literature being that which is most oft associated with the creative endeavour of 
“bringing forth new visions for society,” (Dolin 12) then we can see how intimate the 
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relationship between law and literature is. And yet, the relationship breaks down in the face 
of the practice of torture. In short, if law and literature are world-making, and torture—as the 
work of Elaine Scarry shows us—is world destroying or ‘unmaking’ (Scarry 1985); when law 
creates the conditions for, and writes the definitions of, torture, then it too becomes world 
destroying. Following Heidegger, “language is the house of being,” it is that which creates 
community (Heidegger ‘Letter on Humanism’ 1946, quoted in Ward 15). But words can also 
“wreak havoc” (Bourdieu ‘Intellectual Field’ 146, quoted in Dolin 13) and when the law 
ceases to be that positive “meaning-making function that pervades social life,” (Binder and 
Weisberg 17, quoted in Mark Sanders 478); when there is a de Manian “linguistic dilemma” 
within its very logical and grammatical structure which necessarily prevents coherence of 
meaning there is much at stake; we witness the havoc, the destruction, the un-making, of the 
social world. Torture simultaneously destroys being in the world and the house of being that 
is language. And it is here once again where the need for literature and literary analysis 
comes to the fore. After all, torture has always already been written into the legal and racial 
codes in the U.S. and is a fundamental part of the civilising process of modernity, and it is 
literature that consistently exposes this dark paradox of the democratic tradition.   
 Carl Schmitt famously asserted that “in times of crisis […] the state remains, whereas 
law recedes;” in other words, a state’s commitment to govern through the law is challenged 
in the face of an emergency (Schmitt 12; quoted in Ramraj 3). But, as Victor V. Ramraj 
reminds us, the rule of law might recede, but the law does not disappear. Rather, it is 
galvanised in order to strengthen the authority of the state. “[M]ost modern states turn swiftly 
to law in times of emergency,” with “[t]he global response to the 11 September 2001 attacks 
on the United States being no exception,” he tells us, and it is a “common tendency in an 
emergency […] to invoke the law […] to empower the state” (3).  As was clear from the 
direction of the administration of George W Bush and “the lawyers who enabled it” the move 
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was “toward a unitary executive with essentially unlimited powers to act against threats 
foreign and domestic” (Chesterman 53). The prohibition of torture is regarded in international 
law as jus cogens and one of the least controversial legal principles, and yet we see the 
United States of America utilising the rule of law to defend rather than challenge the 
executive powers allowing for the use of torture in the name of national security.  
             *** 
 
The linguistic and logical feats of the law explored by The Water Cure cut right to the 
very heart of the executive structures of the United States after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11th 2001 with the White House’s legal counsel providing a case for the limited 
legal permissibility of torture (although, it should be noted that the term torture is not used) 
with some fancy footwork creating new legal conditions based on a reinterpretation of Article 
2 of the U.S. Constitution. A new paradigm was created whereby only laws consistent with 
the Constitution are legitimate and the President, as Commander in Chief, is the only figure 
permitted to order the use of torture, to wage war, and to protect the interests of national 
security. Efforts to limit executive discretion over military, Federal, or international law is 
deemed unconstitutional. Thus, the President is legally permitted to order the use of torture. 
In 2005 the leaked legal and governmental torture memos were published exposing the 
communication between U.S. government officials to authorize and to document coercive 
interrogation and torture in Afghanistan, Guantanamo, and Abu Ghraib (Greenberg and 
Dratel 2005) despite it being forbidden under international law. The documents set out the 
argument that the administration could undertake any action without repercussion as long as 
it was consistent with U.S. law (as set out in the new interpretation of the Constitution). As 
Philippe Sands states, after the Abu Ghraib scandal was reported in late 2003  
we did not know that lawyers in the US Department of Justice and elsewhere in the 
Administration had provided detailed legal advice to the US government on the 
international torture rules. But over the weeks that followed a rich source of leaked 
legal memos and opinions threw light on the logic which provided the context in 
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which Abu Ghraib could happen. The documents argued…that the international rules 
were inapplicable, irrelevant or unenforceable (Sands 205).  
 
This reinterpretation of constitutional rights forms part of the rewriting of torture 
itself in the war against terrorism. At every point borderline or outright illegal activities were 
authorized through changing the name, altering the terms, manipulating the language through 
which reality is created: torture has become enhanced interrogation; kidnapping is now 
extraordinary rendition; confession is no longer, instead we have actionable intelligence; 
prisoner or citizen is unlawful enemy combatant –a subject without rights and legal existence 
since they are linguistically constructed as outside of the law. The illegal was made legal, the 
law was made through breaking the law and making itself anew.6          
  As Stephen Hopgood makes clear, the prohibition against torture is supposed to be a 
“desirable and accepted practice” where natural law, “customary law (accepted practice), and 
treaty law (a signed convention) all reinforce each other” (Hopgood 13). And yet, after 9/11 
all were undermined in the name of national security. Five days after the terrorist attacks of 
9/11 Vice President Dick Cheney stated that, “[w]e’ll have to work […] the dark side, if you 
will. We’ve got to spend time in the shadows in the intelligence world. A lot of what needs to 
be done here will have to be done quietly, without any discussion, using sources and methods 
that are available to our intelligence agencies – if we are going to be successful…[I]t’s going 
to be vital to us to use any means at our disposal…to achieve our objectives” (Cheney ‘Meet 
the Press’). Shortly afterwards, President George W Bush signed a memorandum allowing 
the CIA to establish a secret detention and interrogation operation, and on September 26th 
Cofer Black, a US counterterrorism expert, testified in Congress that there was a “before 9/11 
and an after 9/11, and after 9/11 the gloves came off.” What the administration makes clear in 
the days following the terrorist attacks is their belief that acts of torture elicit actionable 
intelligence—confessions, in other words— that torture can produce truth, that there is a 
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direct relationship between torture and truth, and therefore in the face of a new terroristic 
threat, in order to get to the truth to keep America safe, it was necessary to undertake acts of 
torture.  
 In their 2007 book, Torture: When the Unthinkable is Morally Permissible, Australian 
lawyers and Professors of Law, Mirko Bagaric and Julie Clarke, set out a moral utilitarian 
argument for the use of torture in the context of the war on terror. The reason torture is 
“defensible and necessary,” they argue, “is because the justification manifests from the 
closest thing we have to an inviolable right: the right to self-defense: which […] extends to 
the defense of another.” The main tenet of their argument is that violating a wrong-doer’s 
“right to physical integrity” is morally permissible if the persecutor of that torture is doing so 
in order to save the lives of others.  Indeed, for them it is “indefensible to suggest that there 
should be an absolute ban on torture” because without it states are at risk of preferring the 
“interests of the wrongdoer” over the interests of their own innocent citizens (Bagaric and 
Clarke viii). Furthermore, the authors suggest that the “absolute ban on torture reveals a 
fundamental shortcoming of our moral code” with the “preference for the interests of the 
wrongdoer” only being possible “in a moral vacuum, devoid of overarching moral theory” 
(xi). 
 I set out this legal and moral argument for the use of torture in order to illustrate the 
emergence and nature of what we might term ‘the great torture debate’ in the face of the war 
against terror and revelations about the use of torture by the U.S. and its allies. Since the war 
began in earnest in the autumn of 2001, we have witnessed a wealth of scholarship and 
commentary on torture: what it is and whether it can be ever justifiably employed. What we 
find is that the debate is dominated by a distinct moral utilitarianism of which the above 
position is representative. According to this stance, there should be limited legal 
permissibility to practice torture when deemed necessary to the interests of the state, with the 
   
 
11 
practice of torture being subject to judicial or executive oversight. Another strand of this 
utilitarian position sees advocates arguing against legal legitimation but rather for limited 
moral permissibility with political or military agents being able to break the law and permit 
the use of or commit acts of torture in exceptional cases. In either form, the utilitarian 
argument is seductive in its logic (summed up most often in the ‘ticking time bomb scenario’ 
thought experiment), a binding logic from which it is difficult to think out of; after all, who 
would not wish to save X number of people by torturing the alleged perpetrator of a 
potentially heinous criminal or terroristic act?7  
 The normalization of torture and public support for the use of torture as a legitimate 
(if unsavory) state practice leads one to imagine that we have truly gone through the looking 
glass of liberal society.8 It should not need underscoring here that torture is illegal—it is 
absolutely forbidden by international law—with the rule against torture being non-derogable 
and not permissible under any circumstances. Further, the right not to be tortured is an 
absolute human right. And yet torture continues to be practiced on a global scale.9 This fact is 
one that advocates of limited permissibility (whether moral or legal) use to support their 
pragmatic positioning. A leading proponent and advocate of the so-called ‘torture warrant,’ 
Alan Dershowitz, reasons that because “[a]ll forms of torture are widespread among nations 
that have signed treaties prohibiting torture,” the current situation is unacceptable as “it 
tolerates torture without accountability.” What is needed, according to Dershowitz, is a legal 
framework whereby torture is a visible and accountable practice. “If torture is being or will 
be practiced,” he asks, “is it worse to close our eyes to it and tolerate its use by low-level law 
enforcement officials without accountability, or instead bring it to the surface by requiring 
that a warrant of some kind be required as a precondition to the infliction of any type of 
torture under any circumstances?” (257). The current situation is not ideal, Dershowitz, 
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acknowledges, but we can’t become idealists foolishly insisting that the rule of law be 
upheld. 10   
 In addition to the philosophical utilitarianism at its heart, it is clear from the torture 
debate that there is perceived to be an intimate relationship between the realms of the moral 
and legal imagination (two spheres which we should take care to distinguish), as well as a 
bold assumption that has been largely taken for granted: that torture works. Bagaric and 
Clarke go as far as to assert that the “main benefit of torture is that it is an effective means of 
gathering information” (12).  It is this commonly held assumption that torture works, that 
there is an integral relationship between torture and the truth, that has resulted in a worrying 
level of public acceptance of illegal abuse. When the Abu Ghraib scandal broke towards the 
end of 2003 and into 2004 with the publication of scenes of harrowing torture by American 
military personnel, the general discomfort of the American (and wider global public) was 
tempered somewhat by the belief that ‘enhanced interrogation’ was somehow justifiable for 
the greater good in the war on terror. The public debate has assumed that torture works in 
practice and all that is left to consider is whether to use it or not. What is more, the debate not 
only inverts the rule of law whereby a person is innocent until proven guilty, but has created 
a situation where there is no need to prove guilt at all, the burden of proof has been lifted, and 
even those who are not suspected of terrorism but who might know something, can be subject 
to torture (Wisnewski and Emerick 35).  
 We see this logic working through The Water Cure. On the level of fabula the novel is 
about an African American divorced male writer of romance fiction which he writes under a 
white American female persona and pseudonym. The narrator, Ishmael Kidder (call me 
Ishmael, he says at one point), is traumatized by the kidnap, rape, and murder of his eleven-
year-old daughter and is seeking revenge as the suspected perpetrator has been released from 
custody uncharged since the police have not been able to establish his guilt. Ishmael finds the 
   
 
13 
suspect and, despite not knowing whether he is indeed guilty of the heinous crime, kidnaps 
him and keeps him in his basement, which he has prepared as a torture chamber in order to 
punish the man. It is in this dark chamber that the novel dissects and exposes the logic of 
torture that I set out above as Ishmael undertakes his torturous actions in order to get to the 
truth, the truth that is potentially locked inside the body of the prisoner, when he is never 
certain about the guilt of the man in his basement torture chamber. The reader is treated to a 
problem solving process as the narrator attempts to argue for his actions: “Man X is identical 
with Man Y. Man X = Man Y. If Man X has properties P, P1, P2…Pn, then Man Y has 
properties P, P1, P2…Pn. […] Is Man X Man Y, and if so why is there a Man Y at all? With 
my vengeance eyes burning the horizon for Man X, will Man Y do [….] The things we think 
when we think to kill. Killing X = Killing Y?” (Everett 39).   
 We know that in fact torture does not work, by which I mean it does not achieve the 
explicit aims set out in current practice—namely intelligence gathering—as was made clear 
in the findings of The Official Senate Report on CIA Torture: Committee Study of the Central 
Intelligence Agency’s Detention And Interrogation Program, published in December 2014. A 
decade after the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, the report confirmed “how little these practices 
did to aid our efforts to bring 9/11 culprits to justice and to find and prevent terrorist attacks 
today and tomorrow” (McCain vii-viii). This, Senator John McCain—whose Senate Floor 
Statement is included in the report—acknowledges, might come as a big surprise to most 
Americans, “since it contradicts the many assurances provided by intelligence officials on the 
record and in private that enhanced interrogation techniques were indispensable in the war 
against terrorism” and in the name of national security (viii).11 McCain, himself a victim of 
torture, asserts that the “objection of those same officials to the release of this report is really 
focused on that disclosure – torture’s ineffectiveness – because we gave up much in the 
expectation that torture would make us safer. Too much” (viii). The fact remains that it 
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should not have come as a shock to anyone as “[w]e know that torture itself did not spring 
from historical or practical evidence of torture’s usefulness. Instead those policy choices, 
driven many political, economic, and ideological factors, have been fueled as well by what 
we might call a resilient folklore of torture’s success” (Athey 185). Indeed, a 2006 report by 
the Intelligence Science Board made clear that, “‘[v]irtually no research indicates accurate 
information can be produced from unwilling sources through torture or coercive 
techniques,’” and that “‘[n]inety-nine percent of US research has been about how to achieve 
compliance not cooperation. Furthermore, the report drew attention to the fact that “most 
personal and anecdotal accounts indicates that torture is not effective’” (Quoted in Athey 
185).   
     *** 
The imperative ethical question of whether narrative should engage with the subject 
of torture is one that continues to test writers and critics. In her essay, ‘Dark Chamber, 
Colonial Scene: Post-9/11 Torture and Representation,’ Stephanie Athey rehearses some of 
the main ethical dilemmas by way of Idelber Avelar’s intervention in the debate (Athey 180-
197). As Athey reminds us, Avelar questions whether, in our need to confront torture, there is 
any place for literature: “testimony, accusation, and empirical studies have told us all we 
need to know about the worldwide spread of torture…Given all this, what do literature or 
philosophy, neither anchored in experience…still have to tell us about the phenomenon?” 
(Avelar 2001 255, quoted in Athey 183). As JM Coetzee cautions, “the scene of the torture 
can spread terror or overwhelm and paralyze the reader or infatuate the audience with the 
torturer’s power.” (Coetzee 1986, quoted in Athey182), and as Athey insists, representation 
“is a moral problem with political consequences” (182). What Athey’s essay underscores is 
that there is a very real danger that inscribing torture into language risks assisting the state 
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perpetrator and that there are urgent questions around how one might “craft narratives that 
counter torture […] display torture in prose [and] resist complicity in terror” (188).  
These are important questions since, “visual, auditory, tactile modes of representation and 
theatricality are central to acts of torture, as are the narratives that surround it” (183).   
Narrative form and language are key to any discussion of what literature can and should do in 
its confrontation of torture since 
‘the torturer’s greatest victory is to define the language in which the atrocity will be 
named’ and, one might add, the narrative in which torture is cast. In this respect 
novels – the foundry of narrative—have the capacity to intervene in the torture debate 
in ways that counter the folklore [of mainstream media and political discourse] and 
offer new strategies and structures for reporting. As laboratories for language and 
narrative strategy, they can derail the political, historical, and emotional cliché, 
bypass cul-de-sacs of logic, and supplant alluring tales with new ones. Novels can 
make historical antecedents relevant and new arguments vivid with graphic 
compression that amplifies their force and extends their reach. As importantly, they 
can identify and then unsettle reader fascinations and expectations. In doing so, they 
can forge new emotional, intellectual, and political investments. (Athey 185/6, 
quoting Avelar 262).  
 
Because narrative is so questionable and potentially dangerous in naming atrocity, Avelar 
calls for a “war on language” (Athey 189), since at the very heart of the issue here is the way 
in which meaning—and truth—is created and narrated in the political and legal fictions of the 
liberal west.  
Everett’s The Water Cure takes up this challenge; there is a violence of language and 
a violence inflicted on language with the entire novel being at war with its own form. It is a 
tortured, fragmented, disordered text, without narrative coherence or chronology and with the 
body of the victim being the tortured body of the text itself. “Fragments. Frag-ments. Frags. 
Fr. m ents. This work is not fragmented; / it is fragments,” our narrator tells us (Everett 16), 
with these fragments making up the ‘plot’, or ‘story’ of the text; conversations with ancient 
philosophers; jokes; philosophical meditations; paradoxes; poems; images; riddles; sections 
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of nonsense; intertextual references; a scathing social critique of Bush’s war on terror and 
more, all of which make up our narrator’s note book.  
 From the epigraph, “the truth rests with God and a little bit with me,” (Yiddish 
proverb) to the first sentence of the novel (which is divided over 7 pages) – “…so we induce / 
and / find / the arduous nowhere”, the novel alerts the reader to its concerns with the 
relationship between reality, being, and language (Everett 1, 3, 5, 7). These ontological 
concerns are introduced slowly and in a manner that purposefully interrupts and disrupts the 
text’s readability and as a consequence unsettles the position of the reader. In short, the first 
three words are given a page alongside an image of a single black line on a grey background 
with the following two words having double blank pages each and the final three appearing 
on a page that resembles more what we might expect from a novel or at the very least, a piece 
of prose. It is a serious sentence—small black markings, words, on large white spaces, stark 
in their becoming, arduous in their making of meaning. But it is also seriously funny as we 
are induced to puzzle over these first few pages of a disrupted sentence replete with a strange 
singular line in order to get to the end of the sentence, only to discover that this first arduous 
journey into the text (the first of many) takes you nowhere at all—the arduous nowhere 
where anything can mean anything at all.  
 In addition to denying narrative or chronological coherence, the unreadability of the 
text apparent from its opening pages as well as language being “shorn of all its referents” 
(McCarthy 74-5) might return us to Paul de Man’s notion of reading as an allegory of 
unreadability. In turn this might lead us to the unreadability of the law whereby “[t]he 
disjunction of the semantic function and the formal structure of language […] cannot be 
described as a simple polarity but rather constitutes the undecidability of grammatical and 
figurative readings” (Angsberg 372). As Angsberg, following de Man, reminds us, “no text is 
conceivable without grammar, [and] no grammar is conceivable without the suspension of 
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referential meaning. Just as no law can ever be written unless one suspends any consideration 
of applicability to a particular entity […] grammatical logic can function only if its referential 
consequences are disregarded” (Angsberg 372). In short, the law is by definition unreadable 
since it cannot allow its “inherent uncertainty to reveal itself” (Angsberg 373). The law’s 
propensity to objective reason—to meaning and world-making— is grammatically 
impossible with its linguistic structures, its internal logic, serving to deceive.  
 The Water Cure is deeply concerned with the ways that language (and by extension, 
the logic of the law it is critiquing) can and does deceive. For example, there are moments in 
other languages which translate as “it is only a pun, pure affectation” (Everett 8); there are 
lists of figures of speech and rhetorical devices: “anaphora / burlesque / quip / jibe / anaphora 
/ reproach / derision / twist / anaphora / metonymy / synecdoche / conceit / anaphora / 
aposiopesis—shhhh / asyndeton—no ands, or buts / litote” (Everett 164); and more than once 
Ishmael challenges the reader to not believe what is being read in a regular moment of 
metafiction.  “This is my sweet and delicious alibi,” he tells us, “And what an alibi it is. I 
simply say that none of this is real. This is not blood on my hands, under my finger-nails. 
This network of implications is no more than mirrors and strings and a little smoke, blood, 
and judgment, good or bad, so well mingled, and perhaps discursive, but only in your 
imagination…” (Everett 148).   
 This central concern with the manner in which the deceptive potential of language—a 
deception made possible through grammatical construction—is able to create meaning 
through conditions of logic signals the novel’s rewriting of the Alice stories. The reader is  
presented with an extract of Carroll’s opening poem, albeit with altered grammar: “for both 
our oars, with little skill. / By little arms are plied, / While little hands make vain pretence / 
Our wanderings to guide” (Everett 181), and the image of the single line that opens the novel 
is developed throughout the text to become the head of a cat—the Cheshire Cat, perhaps, 
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with his head appearing rather than disappearing. In addition, much of The Water Cure is 
written in fragments of nonsense that rather resemble Carroll’s Jabberwocky. For example, 
Lastly, imaghost sublimighty. 
Allways imessgine the weaves of the breach. 
Now pushking, rearing, constant, undenifable.  
Ever may you may luke at the seind and the soon.  
Imassing a storm.  
Severely imagure the surf.  
Deadly huge, rollackng, massive, sowell after swell,  
thundjurious. 
Ever still you kinknot terror your eyes aweee. 
And you killnow that the wives will newt reach you.  
Duely the waves re furightning and though you are not 
Afreud, you fear these waves (Everett 186).  
 
Jabberwocky and the fragments or nonsense sections of The Water Cure resist definite 
meaning for the reader (and Alice) but are not meaningless—they are not without meaning as 
they can be read, despite their linguistic ambiguity.  Humpty Dumpty’s famous declaration 
that “[w]hen I use a word […] it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less” 
(Carroll, Through the Looking Glass 223), not only makes an appearance within The Water 
Cure but encapsulates the very logic of the narrative which establishes new relationships 
between signifieds and signifiers that we cannot comprehend fully in the ‘real’ world and 
along with Alice the reader is inclined to declare that “it seems to fill my head with ideas – 
only I don’t exactly know what they are! Somebody killed something: that’s clear at any rate” 
(169). Significantly, The Water Cure is punctuated by, or at least peppered with, the 
exclamation “Shan’t”, which is, of course, the cook’s declaration when the King demands 
that he show evidence at the trial. In the world of The Water Cure Ishmael Kidder, as well as 
the CIA and U.S. government which the novel interrogates, embody this very declaration.     
 This is not merely intertextual play as with other works which appear throughout the 
novel (most obviously Moby Dick), but a rewriting of Alice for the twenty-first century. As 
such, The Water Cure explores contemporary concerns with the workings of language, logic, 
and law, just as the Alice stories did in their own nineteenth century context. However, in this 
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version Alice is dead—she is the murdered daughter, but also we, the readers, are Alice. And 
yet it is even more: Alice is also the world, civilization, culture itself; a world at the mercy of 
the U.S: “Who is to say that in the middle of it all [the novel] I cannot stop and say […] that 
my nation shames me as it rapes the world […] All right here in the middle of what is a novel 
about something else. Is there really anything else?” (Everett 62-3). If Alice’s Adventures in 
Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass can be considered complex linguistic jokes at 
Alice’s expense, where she is powerless as she doesn’t have access to the requisite 
knowledge to make sense, then The Water Cure is a linguistic joke at the readers’ expense. 
And in a text that ruminates on the nature of being and subjectivity, it is the readers who are 
written into being as dead subjects, non-subjects, subjects of this tortuous text. The reader 
enters this disturbing wonderland, this mirror world, without the requisite tools to navigate 
the terrain—and that is the point. As with the Alice stories, nonsense language, parody, 
fantasy may, “be considered similar in one respect: they explode or transgress the frame of 
the ‘real’ and thus open up a space of uncertainty. Pushing towards the realm of the non-
signification where nothing is stable, these forms open up a gap between signifier and 
signified which makes a definite meaning or absolute reality impossible to attain” (Shires 
267, quoted in Turner 248). This space of the impossibility of meaning in The Water Cure is 
the law in which American citizens (and by extension its allies in the war on terror) are all 
bound, and specifically the conditions of torture which it allows through its linguistic 
slippage, its logical construction.  
 It might be suggested that the law in this case enacts Wittgenstein’s theory of 
language games in much the way that the Alice stories and The Water Cure do. Indeed, the 
texts (including the law as text) more than simply indicate that language is not separate from 
reality or that language does not need to be clear in order to be meaningful (both of which we 
do see throughout the texts, of course), but more that language rules which cannot be 
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followed lead to a breakdown in language which creates a form of madness. Laws that allow 
for the use of torture are a kind of madness, to be sure, and Wonderland and the inner and 
literary world of Ishmael Kidder are, too. The reader, as Alice, is implicated within this 
madness: “‘How do you know I am mad?’ said Alice. ‘You must be,’ said the Cat, ‘or else 
you wouldn’t have come here’” (Everett 66). But, as with the Cheshire Cat, it is through 
logical argument that The Water Cure proves the assertion that the deception of language and 
by extension the law creates such a madness.  
 The Water Cure is dominated by descriptions of, mediations on, and interactions with 
ancient philosophers from Heraclitus, Aristotle, Plato, Socrates, Seneca, Zeno, Thales, 
Parmenides, Anaximenes, to Anaximander, and more, which all center around the origins of 
things, of being, the logos, sets of paradoxes, principles of logic and argument, and how to 
influence the burden of proof. There are too many and they are far too lengthy to quote here, 
and many are conversations or arguments between philosophers (more often than not highly 
amusing), but all point to and explore the processes of logic in argument so that despite the 
facts in front of you you might win an argument by following a principle. Much like the law, 
a recurring proposition is that the best argument is that based on the purest form of logic 
which is to reduce everything to nothing; Zeno’s reductio ad absurdum. Nothingness is the 
only place of stability in this textual world where so much is unstable, dismembered, cut up 
into pieces, and fragmented, as demonstrated through the inclusion of the ‘nothing 
machine’—or the British Inertial Energy Programme—so-named because its ability to 
stabilize “pure nothing” (Everett 53).  If, as Elaine Scarry suggests, the basic structures of 
culture are to stabilize the sign, then there is no culture in the world of the novel. Civilization 
is dead, murdered by the perpetrators of torture.  
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 As in Alice, the law is the textual fabric of The Water Cure, with both texts being 
concerned with—and made out of—logic and illogic, order and disorder, justice and 
injustice, meaning and arbitrariness. As Catherine Siemann highlights  
Carroll’s texts are filled with a generalized anxiety about the law. Alice in 
Wonderland ends with a trial, and the arbitrary rule of law of the Queen of Hearts is a 
thread (and a threat) that runs throughout the text. The chess-board world of Through 
the Looking Glass is so rule-bound that hardly an action occurs that is not in some 
way governed by the progress of the game; the rules of chess here represent the law of 
the land. Only at the end of each book, when Alice has come to terms with and 
learned to defy the dominant legal system, does she regain control of her situation and 
complete her journey (431).  
 
Furthermore, “confrontation with the prevailing system of law is central to each of Alice’s 
adventures” (451) and Alice must engage in numerous acts of defiance against the systemic 
injustice of Wonderland, with its justice system rooted in absolute power. In both books it is 
the prevailing system of law, magnified by the absurd logic of nonsense, that Alice must 
overcome to complete her journeys (452). This is the stuff of the The Water Cure only this 
defiance is no longer a possibility: the young girl is dead, murdered in the most unimaginable 
way, and instead the reader is Alice reading the protagonist playing precisely by the rules of 
the game, following the nonsense logic and law of the land to the letter through his act and art 
of torture. He is the law, he is the United States, and the reader must negotiate the Carollian 
chessboard that is woven throughout the text in words and images in order to challenge the 
logic of the law. “There’s the law and there’s the law,” we are told, “There might be a law 
against it, but that doesn’t mean you can’t do it. The law is just words after all […] It’s the 
American way” (Everett 118).  
 As in Through the Looking Glass, in Ishmael’s house of horrors, the punishment 
comes before the trial. He is the Queen of Hearts – “sentence first – verdict afterwards!” – 
and the reader is Alice in her attempts to impose logical order on a distinctly illogical system; 
one that in its panoptical structures operates backwards. Torture in The Water Cure becomes 
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the trial scene of Alice with the guilt or innocence of the detainee (rather than defendant) 
being of little significance and the subject being reduced to a basic function, that of being 
uncreated and unmade through language. By rewriting Alice Everett’s long linguistic joke, 
this Carollian game of chess, demonstrates that rather than the relationship between justice 
and logic being disconnected because of the apparent relationship between justice and truth it 
is in fact intimately connected through the inherent logic of the seemingly illogical. Truth as 
a logical category is meaningless, rather the logic of language creates a deception at the heart 
of the legal frameworks that allow for the destruction of the worlds, the death of creativity 
and the aesthetic. 
              *** 
 If torture does not establish truth, then the question must be asked, what is it for and 
why is its use on the rise? “The object of torture is torture”, we are told in Orwell’s Nineteen 
Eighty-Four (Orwell 227). And as Jean Améry, a Holocaust survivor, most famously makes 
clear, torture is about destruction. The true purpose of torture is to negate being and blot out 
“the contradiction of death”. And further, “whoever was tortured, stays tortured. Torture is 
ineradicably burned into him, even when no clinically objective traces can be detected” (83).  
There are three ways that torture appears in democracies, as Darius Rejali, sets out for us: the 
national security model, the civic discipline model, and the juridical model (22) which 
“correspond roughly [in democracies] to the three main purposes of government torture: to 
intimidate, to coerce false confessions, and to gather accurate security information” (23). In 
short, the national security model seeks information, usually abroad; the juridical model turns 
on true confession which can then be turned into a document and considered and evaluated as 
evidence (whether in a judicial or extra-judicial setting)—torture turned into writing; and the 
civic discipline model is “tied to citizenship [and] inflicted exclusively on noncitizens” 
(Rejali 56) and thus is the punishment of an undesirable person. Torture thrives on the 
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insecurity of modern democracies—and according to Rejali, we “live in a world in which 
torture is returning to a role it had in ancient Greece, inducing civic discipline and shaping 
civil order in liberal democracies” (59). 
 What we see with the use of torture in the war on terror is these three models 
overlapping, or merging together, so that we have torture imagined, written into law, and 
practiced as a way of punishing the other that exists on the periphery of liberal democracy or 
indeed in its heartlands, of condemning people—criminal or otherwise—to a bare disposable 
life, undeserving of protection from any state. The idea of eliciting truth is central to the 
practice, even though torture is highly unlikely to get you anywhere near the truth. But it 
seems that in actual fact that this does not matter. The means are not as important as the end. 
In its truth seeking, the interrogation room is the confessional, the torturer the priest, the act 
of torture, the cleansing. As Stephen F. Eisenman tells us, “[t]here is something special about 
waterboarding, which, since its inception in the late middle ages, has allowed its adepts to 
believe they are engaged not in an act of physical torture, but of moral suasion, and even 
religious sanctification” (135); a forced baptism with the “full cleansing and sanctifying 
power of water.” In this way, the ‘confession’ sought is not one of truthful testimony (as 
we’ve established, there is no relationship between torture and the truth), but a confession of 
“error, apostasy, or moral responsibility” (134). We see this merger of national security, civic 
discipline, and juridical forms of torture within The Water Cure: the water cure of the title 
refers, of course, to the act of waterboarding: a favorite enhanced interrogation technique of 
the CIA in the twenty-first century, and one which Senator John McCain calls “an exquisite 
form of torture” which constitutes a “mock execution” and the use of which is “shameful” 
(McCain vi)12 and its place within the novel reminds us of the horrors at the heart of the post-
Enlightenment liberal modernizing project whereby all others are reduced to non-beings and 
the liberal subject reduced to brutality in order to preserve the self.  
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 It is clear that torture destabilises existence and both provides the conditions for the 
suspension of, and is somehow the opposite of, the truth is purports to seek. Indeed, as 
Wisenewski and Emerick summarize, both the CIA’s Kubark Interrogation Manual (1963) 
and the CIA Human Resource Exploitation Manual (1993) assert that the aim of torture is to 
breakdown the identity of a person; to break down a subject’s world and understanding of 
self. Ultimately, it is a regressive act which seeks to “enforce a loss of autonomy” (Kubark 
Interrogation Manual, 1963, quoted in Wisenewski and Emerick 30). Furthermore, the 
Human Resource Exploitation Manual makes clear that the most effective way to do this is to 
turn the subject’s body against itself, “obliterating agency by turning agency on itself” 
(Wisenewski and Emerick 30, 56). As a destabilizer of existence, of being, torture is a 
categorical and ontological deceit; it is, to follow Elaine Scarry, a display of agency that 
allows one person’s body to become another person’s voice, that allows the real human pain 
to be converted into a “fiction of power” (Scarry 18).   
As Scarry explains, it is  
astonishing but obvious: for that torture and war are acts of destruction (and hence 
somehow the opposite of creation), that they entail the suspension of civilization (and 
are somehow the opposite of civilization), are things we have always known and 
things one immediately apprehends even when viewing these two events from a great 
distance; the only thing that could not have been anticipated from a distance but that 
is forced upon us as self-evident once we enter the interior of these two events is that 
they are, in the most literal and concrete way possible, an appropriation, aping, and 
reversing of the action of creating itself (21).  
 
The Alice stories and The Water Cure enact the relationships between subject and object, 
fiction and reality, through language. To wield language in these texts, be it intelligible or 
otherwise, is to have the power to define, create, and to destroy. When language ceases, so 
does existence. In The Water Cure it is torture that makes language cease. This novel 
embodies the destruction of language that torture ensures. As Elaine Scarry explains, 
“physical pain does not simply resist language but actively destroys it, bringing about an 
immediate reversion to a state anterior to language, to the sounds and cries a human being 
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makes before language is learned” (4). And further, “its resistance to language is not simply 
one of its incidental or accidental attributes but is essential to what it is” (4). It is this 
destruction of language through torture that leads to Scarry’s ‘unmaking of the world’ that 
marks the end of civilization and it is this that The Water Cure embodies. For Scarry the 
structure of torture includes the incommunicability of pain, the power relation between 
torturer and victim, and the fiction of power previously referred to. The very structure of the 
novel enacts all of these elements of torture and more. The kidnapped and tortured victim 
does not have a voice, is spoken to, named, defined, with the torture being described in 
accordance with Scarry’s insistence that part of the structure is the two bodies feeling such 
different things. But it is more: The Water Cure is a tortured text. A tortured text because the 
tortured body of Kidder’s victim is also the body of writing that is the text with the violence 
and torture being wholly textual. As suggested above, the fragmented, ‘broken’ narrative 
destroys language’s ability to make meaning, to make sense. Words and sentences don’t 
mean what you expect them to mean, they are manipulations in a slippery game. The 
language of The Water Cure is violent but also the subject of violence. It is torturer and 
tortured. It is through these means that the novel resists the representation of torture, resists 
even narrative itself and rises to Avelar’s call for a “war on language” in the face of torture.   
 The act of naming is, of course, an act of power and violence. “Names,” Ishmael 
informs his victim, or his subject as he prefers to call him, “are always just substitutes for 
nouns, and you know what good nouns are. I will name you. […] I name you W. Poor, poor 
W.[…] I have renamed you Art and now you are Art and no longer W. My god, what have I 
done to you? Poor, poor W. now has a new name. Just like that a new name” (Everett 90). As 
Scarry’s work makes clear, denying or changing the subject’s name begins the process of 
dehumanization so integral to torture and it is important that the new name (W) is a pun on 
George W. Bush’s name as well as indicating a doubling which reminds us of Ferdinand 
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Haenel’s reflections on torture as being a “downward slope from power to powerlessness 
experienced in relation to the perpetrator who has ripped apart the victim’s ego and world 
into two or more pieces” (Haenel 1, quoted in Wisenewski and Emerick 57). In addition, Art 
is a noun through which to explore the complex relationship between and the limits of 
aesthetics and the law in the face of torture. In the novel Art becomes the technology and the 
subject of torture.  
you are my masterpiece. How does that strike you? I will continue to work on you 
every day, nudging clay here, tempering hue there, chipping at a corner, changing 
tense, altering key. In my mind, somewhere in this sick thing I call a mind, I have a 
picture of my goal, a model of my ideal. You are not my phoenix and neither, sadly 
for you, is your destruction (Everett 117).  
 
The language of the novel, the words that Ishmael utters, are an extension of the cutting of his 
knife, as well as threats and part of the process of torture, reminding us once more of the 
violence of language. With the body of the victim forming the body of the text we are 
voyeurs to the process of writing itself in the making and unmaking of this literary world, the 
suspension of culture, the destruction of civilization; through the structures and logic of 
torture we are presented with the very opposite of world-making and aesthetic creation.  
The Water Cure inverts domestic space. The home, that place where Ishmael 
reminisces about family life, is transformed into that which hides within it a chamber of 
horrors. The basement is described in brutal terms, with walls and ceilings turned into 
weapons—to suspend, to stick, to harness, and to hang the eighteen mirrors which reflect 
multiple selves back to the victim. We see ordinary objects (mirrors, a chair, tape) take on 
new, twisted significance with the world being reduced to that of the torturer. Elaine Scarry 
has shown how the space of torture becomes the world of the victim, the perpetrator of 
torture dramatizing the disintegration of that world as well as the obliteration of 
consciousness. This inversion, she argues, is what unmakes the world for the victim but also 
for the culture that engages with torture. The unmaking of civilization requires “a return to 
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and mutilation of the domestic, the ground of all making” (Scarry 47). Though torture the 
world is reduced to the room; it is the home but an inversion of the domestic and all that 
implies. The comforts or features of the home turn in on the prisoner and become weapons; 
the bed, the sink, the walls, the floor, the chair, and the bathtub. Objects are unmade as the 
prisoner is unmade: this is civilisation undone (Scarry 38-45). The respect and dignity usually 
afforded to a human subject is absent and a subject is reduced to mere body where meaning-
making, being-in-the-world and, as Améry articulated, “trust in the 
world” and feeling at “home in the world” is destroyed (Améry 83,87).   
     *** 
Dawes’ article that I opened with successfully creates the parameters for connecting 
the subfield of literature and human rights to the “urgent work on ethics, rights, and aesthetics 
produced over decades in Americanist literary study” (129). He is concerned to explore the 
benefits of considering specifically American literature and human rights rather than as “a 
matter of world systems” due to the ways in which in the U.S. “human rights signifies 
differently” (133) generating “distinctive literary patterns” which take “not just atrocity 
abroad as its narrative focus but also atrocity at home” (134). The Water Cure is a furious 
confrontation to this atrocity, as well as to the unmaking of civilization that the war on terror 
has accelerated. In this time of crisis, this state of emergency, this state of perpetual war, 
where the law is employed for the interests of the state and the political and cultural 
institutions of the United States have become legalized, we see “war and peace themselves 
ever closer together” (Kennedy 24). In bringing U.S. atrocities abroad directly into a 
domestic space on domestic soil, Everett’s The Water Cure allows the reader to analyze the 
shifts in cultural, political, and significantly, legal, understandings of torture since 9/11 and 
their implications socially and aesthetically in the U.S. context. War is usually regarded as 
exceptional but now it is the new peacetime and as Kennedy insists, “[w]ar today is both 
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continuous with—and sharply distinguishable from—peace,” (5). In other words, there is a 
rhetorical assertion of their distinctiveness but both war and peace lead to the law which is 
now a permanent feature in (liberal Western) peacetime culture. As Kennedy notes, “[l]aw 
has built practical as well as the rhetorical bridges between war and peace, and is the stuff of 
their connection and differentiation” (36). The twenty-first century has witnessed a merger of 
law and war—lawfare, as Kennedy calls it—which, as we have seen, is employed to 
legitimize and justify illegal acts of violence in order to achieve peace and, apparently, the 
preservation of human rights. Torture for peace, Torture for the right not to be tortured: you 
can see the dystopian slogans straight away.  
With its formal experimentation and rewriting of Caroll’s Alice stories, The Water 
Cure is an interrogation (purposefully and ironically violent) of language, logic, the law—
and literature itself—in the face of arguably the most heinous violation of human rights: 
torture. Through its explorations of the logic of language and the language of logic the novel 
interrogates and embodies what happens when torture becomes the law with the law ceasing 
to be that which builds the social world but rather than which breaks and unmakes it. When 
confronted with the practice of torture, the novel ceases to be worldmaking and instead enacts 
the world unmade. Torture and war destroy the vital and civilization and it is humanity that is 
at stake: “[t]he day we stop condemning torture…is the day we stop being human beings” 






1 Dawes argues for the importance of Americanist literary criticism to engage with the human 
rights framework which it has until now avoided because of the problematic translation of 
civil rights into human rights with the latter’s universalising discourse potentially flattening 
the urgent historic specificities of race relations in the United States. Accordingly, civil rights 
is a constitutional matter that invokes the concept of the citizen rather than the human. He 
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